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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is conferred upon this court by
section 78-2a-3(2)(h), Utah Code Annotated. This appeal
is from a final order of the Third Judicial District
Court in Salt Lake County, Utah.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.
Is notice to a partnership or its nondebtor partners required before a charging order may be
i

issued against a judgment debtor who is also a partner?
2.
Is a court empowered to order the
production of partnership tax records and other records
of the partnership as a necessary adjunct to its authority to issue charging orders?
3. Does a charging order entail the procedural
requirements of a motion for summary judgment?
STATUTES TO BE INTERPRETED
Utah Code Annotated
48-1-16:

Partnership books.

The partnership books shall be keptf subject
to any agreement between the partners, at the principal
place of business of the partnership, and every partner
shall at all times have access to and may inspect and
copy any of them.
48-1-19: Right to an account.
Any partner shall have the right to a formal
account as to partnership affairs:
(1) If he is wrongfully excluded from the
partnership business or possession of its property by his
copartners.
(2) If the right exists under the terms of any
agreement.
(3) As provided by Section 48-1-18.
(4) Whenever other circumstances render it
just and reasonable.
48-1-25:
order.

Partner's interest subject to charging

(1) On due application to a competent court
by any judgment creditor of a partner the court which
entered the judgment, order, or decree, or any other
ii

court, may charge the interest of the debtor partner with
payment of the unsatisfied amount of such judgment debt
with interest thereon and may . . . make all other
orders, directives, accounts and inquiries which the
debtor partner might have made or which the circumstances
of the case may require.

iii

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the case
The plaintiffs, Crayton
(hereafter

"Walker") obtained

against Gerald H. Bagley

a

and

Jeanne Walker

stipulated

(hereafter

judgment

"Bagley"), then

sought and were granted a charging order against the
interest of Bagley in a partnership known as Jordan
Acres.

Bagley opposed the motion, alleging that the

order was too broad, that there was no affidavit or other
evidence regarding the existence of the partnership or
Bagley's interest in it, and that the partnership was not
joined or given notice of the motion for the charging
order.

Bagley now appeals the entry of the charging

order by the lower court.

Statement of the Facts

The

Walkers

initially

obtained

judgment against Bagley on June 28, 1985.

a

default

(R. 20-21).

However, that judgment was set aside in favor of the
parties' stipulation to the entry of an amended judgment
against Bagley in the amount of $7500.00. The stipulation was entered on January 23, 1986. (R. 70).
Some two years later, on February 4, 1988, Walker filed

1

a motion for a charging order against the interest of
Bagley in the Jordan Acres Partnership.

(R. 82).

On

June 24, 1988f the lower court granted the motion and
entered the charging order, notwithstanding Bagley's
objections as noted above.

(R. 121-3).

In addition to

Bagley"s share of the profits and surplus of the partnership itself, the order mandates disclosure of all assets
sold or transferred by the partnership after the entry
of the judgment, the partnership's tax returns for the
years 1985 through 1987, and payment of "all profits,
income, payments from the Partnership payable to Gerald
Bagley and any right of any kind to receive any asset
from the Partnership, regardless of whether distributed
from capital, profits, or surplus, or as an expense of
the Partnership."

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Point I.

The Utah Uniform Partnership Act,

which is found in Title 48 of the Utah Code Annotated,
1953 as amended, allows a judgment creditor to obtain a
charging order against the interest of his debtor in a
partnership.

A charging order does not operate against

the partnership or the non-debtor partners, and therefore
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does not require that notice be given to them before the
order may be issued.
Point II. Appellant's comparison of a motion
to obtain a charging order to a motion for summary
judgment has no basis in law, and should be rejected by
this court.
Point III.

The charging order sought and

obtained was not overly broad.

It merely empowered the

court, and the Walkers, to obtain information to which
Bagley already had unlimited access.

It was reasonable

in its scope, seeking as it did information regarding the
extent of Bagley1s interest in the partnership, which was
essential

in

order

to

apply

satisfaction of the judgment.

that

interest

toward

Moreover, the charging

order amounts to a lien rather than an assignment, and
the statutory procedures governing the assignment of
partnership interests have no bearing on the present
case.

ARGUMENT

POINT I:

THE UTAH UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT DOES NOT

REQUIRE THAT OTHER PARTNERSr OR THE PARTNERSHIP,
BE GIVEN NOTICE WHEN A CHARGING ORDER IS SOUGHT.

3

Section 48-1-25 of the Utah Code provides that
a partner's interest in a partnership is subject to a
charging order, issued "on due application" by a judgment
creditor of the debtor partner to a court of competent
jurisdiction.

The purpose of such an order is to make

the debtor's share of partnership profits and surpluses
available for the satisfaction of judgments against him.
A charging order against the partnership interest of the
debtor partner does not operate against the partnership
itself; nor does it apply to partnership property as
such.
In this appeal, Bagley seeks to invalidate the
charging order, partly on the ground
partners, and the partnership
proper

notice

of

the

that the other

entity, were not given

hearing

on

Walker's

motion.

However, the Uniform Partnership Act does not require
that such notice be given; and the case of Phillips v.
Phillips, 400 P. 2d 450 (Colo. 1964), which is relied
upon by Bagley to show that the mailing of a notice to
the attorney

for the debtor-partner

was

insufficient

notice under the Act, is not applicable to the present
case.

In Phillips, Lilian Phillips was the partner

against whom the charging order was sought. Nothing was
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said in the opinion about the need to notify any other
partners, and the notice giving rise to the appeal was
sent

to

properly

Lilian's
held

former

to

be

a

attorneys.
defective

This was

notice,

quite

since

the

attorneys no longer represented Lilian, her case having
concluded in a final determination of the issues raised
in the pleadings.

The court reasoned that the charging

order in Phillips amounted to a new claim, requiring new
notice to be given.
First

No such circumstances exist here.

National

Bank

of

Denver

v.

District

Court, 652 P. 2d 613 (Colo. 1982), a case also relied on
by Bagley, is likewise distinguishable from the present
case.

First National Bank involved the modification of

an earlier order charging the partnership interests of
the judgment debtors. Such a modification would have had
the

effect

of

dissolving

the

partnership,

and

the

Colorado court held that it did not comply with the
statutory

requirements

partnerships.

for

the

dissolution

of

Again, no such situation exists here, and

the First National Bank

case is inapplicable to the

present controversy.
In this case, Bagley was properly and timely
notified that a charging order was being sought against
him.

He was present at the hearing on the motion, and
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had ample opportunity to resist the motion at that time.
That other partnersf and the partnership entity itself,
were

not

notified

is

irrelevant

in

this

context.

Therefore, Bagley's contention that the charging order
should be reversed is without merit.
The lower court did not err in issuing the
charging order without first sending notice to the nondebtor partners. The notice sent to Bagley's counsel was
adequate under the facts of the present case, and the
order will not have an adverse impact on the remaining
partners. Therefore, the failure to notify them does not
require a reversal of the charging order.

POINT II: A MOTION FOR A CHARGING ORDER IS NOT
A MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND SHOULD NOT
BE TREATED AS ONE.

Bagley's second contention appears to be that
because a motion for a charging order bears some superficial resemblance to a motion for summary judgment, it
must conform to the requirements of Rule 56, Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure.

No statutory or case authority is

presented in support of this contention, apparently for
the simple reason that there is none. The charging order
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is based on a judgment previously entered against Mr.
Bagley, and for that reason more closely resembles a writ
of attachment or garnishment than a motion for summary
judgment.

Supporting

affidavits/

interrogatories,

depositions, and admissions are not necessary for the
issuance of post-judgment remedies, and are only required
under Rule 56 because summary judgment has the effect of
depriving a party of trial on the merits. That situation
does not exist here, and Bagley's contention should be
rejected by the court.

POINT III: THE CHARGING ORDER WAS NOT
OVERLY BROAD.

In contending that the charging order is too
broad in its scope, Bagley likens the charging order to
an assignment, but once again his emphasis is misplaced.
A charging order has been defined as "a type of lien on
[a partner's] interest in the firm."
702 P. 2d 631, 641 (Alaska 1985).

Blake v. Gilbert,

A lien is a right to

enforce a charge upon the property of another for payment
or satisfaction of a claim, and cannot be construed to
mean "sale," "transfer," "delivery," or "assignment."
Vaughan v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 61 S. W. 2d
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189, 190 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933);

see also Highland Park

State Bank v. Salazary 555 S. W. 2d 484, 487 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1987); Warren Tool Co. v. Stephenson, 161 N. W. 2d
133, 142 (Mich. 1968).
Since a charging order is a lien and not an
assignment, the statutes cited by Bagley relating to the
assignment of partnership interests are not applicable
to the controversy now facing this court.

The final

question presented on appeal is whether the order itself
is too broad, in that it requires the partnership itself
to submit certain records to the court.
Utah Code Ann. section 4 8-1-25 empowers the
court issuing the charging order to "make all other
orders, directions, accounts and inquiries which the
debtor partner might have made or which the circumstances
of the case may require."

In effect, therefore, the

court, for this limited purpose, steps into the position
of the debtor partner.

Other provisions of the Utah

Uniform Partnership Act allow an individual partner
unlimited access to the partnership books (section 48-116),

and the right to a formal account of partnership

affairs (section 48-1-19).
case

does

not

seek

The charging order in this

information

that

would

not

be

available to Mr. Bagley if he should request it himself.
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If Bagley's interest in the partnership is to be applied
toward satisfaction of the judgment against him, it
follows that the court must determine the nature and
extent of that interest, and the information sought by
the order is reasonably related to that objective.

CONCLDSION

The charging order against Mr. Bagley was
adequately grounded in existing substantive and procedural law. There being no valid reason to overturn it, and
the policy of the Court of Appeals being to defer to the
discretion of the lower court except in cases of clear
error, it follows that the charging order must be upheld.

Respectfully submitted,
ZOLL & BRANCH

By: /? .\/Ut>y 'ZvLk
B . Ray

Zoll
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